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Abstract. The 5G network systems are evolving and have complex net-
work infrastructures. There is a great deal of work in this area focused on
meeting the stringent service requirements for the 5G networks. Within
this context, security requirements play a critical role as 5G networks
can support a range of services such as healthcare services, financial and
critical infrastructures. 3GPP and ETSI have been developing security
frameworks for 5G networks. Our work in 5G security has been focusing
on the design of security architecture and mechanisms enabling dynamic
establishment of secure and trusted end to end services as well as develop-
ment of mechanisms to proactively detect and mitigate security attacks
in virtualised network infrastructures. The focus of this paper is on the
latter, namely the facilities and mechanisms, and the design of a security
architecture providing facilities and mechanisms to detect and mitigate
specific security attacks. We have developed and implemented a simpli-
fied version of the security architecture using Software Defined Networks
(SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) technologies. The
specific security functions developed in this architecture can be directly
integrated into the 5G core network facilities enhancing its security. We
describe the design and implementation of the security architecture and
demonstrate how it can efficiently mitigate specific types of attacks.
Keywords: 5G security, SDN Security, Security Architecture, State based Se-
curity Attack Detection, NFV Security
1 Introduction
Future networked systems must provide services to a vast array of applications
and devices with competing and even conflicting requirements while simultane-
ously allowing flexible deployment. Todays networks, with their one-size-fits-all
architectural approach, are unable to address the diverging performance require-
ments that vertical industries such as manufacturing, automotive, healthcare,
energy, and media and entertainment impose in terms of latency, scalability, se-
curity, availability, and reliability. Two major trends in future networked systems
include the fifth-generation mobile systems (5G) and software defined network
architectures which are anticipated to open up innovation opportunities for sat-
isfying such requirements in these applications. Increasingly such networks are
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highly heterogeneous with many different devices, from small sensors and IoT
and network devices to many different clients and servers and peripherals. Such
a complex heterogeneous environment supporting distributed applications and
services with many network devices, supporting user and device mobility and
dynamic variation in networks (e.g. due to failure of devices and network links)
can be subjected to sophisticated security attacks.
The overall aim of our research work is to consider the choices involved in the
design of security architecture and mechanisms for securing 5G services over
multi-domain networks. 5G networks leverage softwarisation and virtualisation
to achieve the service objectives on exibility, congurability, and scalability. In
particular, key design concepts of 5G networks include network slicing (i.e.,
dedicating logical networks for isolated applications), mobile edge computing
(MEC), NFV [12], and SDN [13], [21]. The security of 5G networks and their
communication services are of vital importance as secure and reliable network
services are a prerequisite and enabler for digital markets such as for Industry
4.0 and eHealth. However, there are several challenges arise, which are mainly
due to the networks dynamic environment and the fact that the security require-
ments will be much more stringent than in previous network generations since
the diverse network services from verticals can be mission critical. With 5G ser-
vices, there is a need to take into account new types of trust relations between
participating actors in the security design; whom is to be trusted, in which re-
spect, and to what extent. Furthermore, the use of new technologies like network
virtualisation (i.e., decoupling logical networks from networking hardware) and
SDN will bring new trust issues; in this case trust between application owners
and compute and storage resource providers. In both these cases, the trust rela-
tions will manifest themselves in hard security requirements to enforce required
service level agreements and to protect information exchange between actors.
A cornerstone in developing secure systems is the design of a security architec-
ture in terms of the different entities involved, and their relations and interac-
tions. In the case of 5G, challenges in developing a security architecture arise
not only from the technologies used in 5G but also from the use cases stemming
from the new business environment offered by 5G. For instance, existing security
architectures need to be designed for multi-tenancy operation (e.g. shared phys-
ical infrastructure used by different providers) and need to differentiate trust
relations between the different tenants. Furthermore, the architecture needs to
provide secure support for network virtualisation and network slicing (i.e., ded-
icating logical networks for isolated applications); these requirements are not
satisfied by the existing security architectures. The overall aim of our security
architecture is that it should enable dynamic establishment of secure and trusted
end to end services over networked virtualised infrastructures as well as provide
mechanisms to proactively detect and mitigate security attacks thereby enhanc-
ing network resiliency.
Given this overall context, the focus of this paper is on the latter, namely the fa-
cilities and mechanisms to detect and mitigate specific security attacks, and the
design of a security architecture providing these facilities and mechanisms. We
have developed and implemented this security architecture and experimented
with specific security attacks demonstrating how they can be mitigated in a sin-
gle 5G network operator. This is the main contribution of this paper. We are
continually evolving this security architecture extending with additional security
functionalities.
More specifically, the attacks and security services that are considered in this
paper fall under three main categories:
(i) Facilities and mechanisms detecting and mitigating attacks from malicious
user devices: mechanisms to ensure that only authorised user devices are able to
access services provided by specific network slices as well as the ability to detect
and prevent attacks from compromised but authorised user devices.
(ii) Facilities and mechanisms for monitoring infrastructure components in 5G
networks: mechanisms for validating the state of these components, which in
turn can be used in the provision of trusted services as well as used in attack
detection, for instance, on network switches.
(iii) Facilities and mechanisms for provisioning security-as-a-service in 5G net-
works: mechanisms enabling security-as-a-service to users and specific devices.
For instance, for some IoT and legacy devices, which are resource-constrained
or can lack capacity for hosting security functionalities.
We will then demonstrate the applicability of the proposed security architecture
using an IoT based use case scenario. The selected use case represents a com-
mon scenario in 5G networks, as it is envisaged that they are likely to support
a number of devices utilising their services managed by different actors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the
use case scenarios for attacker model from which the specific security require-
ments that are to be addressed by the architecture in this paper are derived. In
Section 3, the design of the security architecture and the security mechanisms
for detecting and mitigating attacks are described. Then we discuss the use case
scenarios in 5G networks demonstrating the applicability of the proposed secu-
rity architecture. We describe the implementation of the developed architecture
and the analysis of attacks in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the relevant related
works and in Section 6 we draw some conclusions and outline further work.
2 Motivating Use Case Scenario
Consider a scenario where each user can use multiple devices to access various
services in different slices in 5G networks. For instance, a user uses his/her
laptop (user equipment (UE1)) to carry out banking operations using a cloud
service while at the same time his/her wearable device (user equipment (UE2))
is uploading health-related data to a server (S) in the cloud. These devices are
accessing services in two different network slices, namely the wearable device is
using services in a healthcare slice whereas the mobile device is using banking
services in a financial slice.
When the gNodeB (in the 5G network) receives a new flow from UE1 to access
financial slice, it needs to be analyzed to determine whether it is an authorised
flow. This gives rise to the first requirement for the security architecture to have
policies and mechanisms to determine whether a user is authorised to access spe-
cific slices, e.g. healthcare slice. These will help to detect attacks by unauthorised
users on specific network slices (Attack 1).
Now assume that the usage of a specific network function within the financial
slice by UE1 exceeds the allowed limits. This gives rise to the second requirement
for the security architecture to have policies and mechanisms for monitoring
the usage of resources by authorised users. This will help to detect attacks by
authorised users on specific network slices (Attack 2).
The 5G network infrastructure components providing the various services in the
5G core and access networks (such as gNodeB) as well as in the Internet and
cloud (such as routers and servers) might have been infected by malware leading
to different attacks (such as DDoS flooding and botnets). This gives rise to the
third requirement for the security architecture to have mechanisms to validate
the state of these resources (both at boot and at runtime) (Attack 3).
Furthermore, when accessing cloud and Internet services, the user can move
between two different radio access networks (RANs) belonging to the same 5G
network operator. This gives rise to the fourth requirement for the security
architecture to ensure that the attacks are detected and mitigated closest to
source of the origin of the attack (Attack 4).
Our security architecture provides security services and mechanisms to counter-
act the attacks outlined in this motivating use case scenario.
3 Security Architecture: Design and Implementation
Our network infrastructure consists of SDN enabled NFV deployment of network
slices running on a network virtualisation infrastructure supporting 5G services.
In such a framework, we have infrastructure providers who own and manage
physical networks and its constituent resources. Tenant leases virtual resources
from one or more infrastructure providers in the form of virtual machines and
uses the virtual networks to provide network services to its users. The network
slice is composed of a collection of virtual network functions (VNFs) that are
composed to build the network services the tenant delivers to its end users. Each
slice can have several VNFs, and each tenant can have several network slices and
orchestrate its resources to satisfy the diverse requirements of the slices.
In this network infrastructure, there are different authorities performing differ-
ent functions on different resources. The logical management authorities in our
overall security architecture comprise the following: System Manager responsible
for creating and managing tenants and their network slices; Network Slice Man-
ager responsible for managing network slices comprising collections of VNFs for
each tenant; VNF Manager responsible for creating and maintaining different
VNFs; Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM) responsible for managing virtual
cloud infrastructures. However, in our implementation described in this paper,
we have combined these different authorities within a SDN Controller.
3.1 Security Requirements
The security requirements for our architecture are based on the need to coun-
teract the following attacks, from the motivating use case scenario above.
(i) Preventing access to slices by unauthorised devices (user equipment/user):
The 5G networks consists of several network slices with specific service require-
ments. For instance, higher network availability requirement for services dealing
with emergency healthcare or control of critical infrastructures. Attackers can
use their devices to generate attacks on multiple slices to impact adversely the
performance of network functions in services in multiple slices. For instance, a
DDoS attack on one slices services can have adverse impact on another slice, if
these two slices share some common VNFs. Hence the need to restrict the slice
access to only authorised devices.
(ii) Devices authorised to access specific slices can generate attacks within these
slices. For instance, attackers can compromise IoT devices that have access to
specific slices and use these devices to generate attacks within the slices. Hence
the need for the network slice manager to monitor and control the usage of slice
resources by authorised devices and detect attacks within the slices.
(iii) The 5G infrastructure components themselves can be vulnerable to differ-
ent types of security attacks (e.g.infected by malware). This can lead to attacks
originating from these infrastructure components, which can have more severe
consequences than the attacks coming from the end devices and users. Often,
network slice managers can be invoking VNFs on virtual infrastructures which
may be deployed on physical devices in an inter-domain environment managed
by a different provider. Hence there is need for techniques to validate the state
of the infrastructure components before VNF deployment.
(iv) Compromise of a VNF can lead to unauthorised access to the virtualization
infrastructure resources, enabling instantiation of new VNFs in insecure phys-
ical infrastructure components. Compromised VNFs can also lead to flooding
attacks such as generation of a huge amount of logs or leaking of information.
(v) Each slice can have different service specific security requirements (depend-
ing on the services in the slice). There can be legacy or even resource constrained
IoT devices in 5G networks, which do not have the capability to implement the
required security functions. Such applications may wish to rely on security func-
tions provided by the specific network slices. Or even users may want to choose
the security functions that are required for their applications (such as confiden-
tiality, integrity etc.). There can also be situations where some legacy devices
may require certain services; in these cases, it is critically important to ensure
that these services are available only to these legacy devices and not to any other
devices in the network. To cater for such requirements, there is a need for the
security architecture to provision security-as-a-service in 5G networks.
3.2 Security Architecture - Design
Assumptions:
(i)As indicated above, we assume there exists a single logical management au-
thority in the form of SDN Controller per domain, which performs the various
functions associated in the management of network slices, VNFs and virtual in-
frastructures.
(ii) We assume that SDN Controller and its various sub-components are not
compromised and hence are trusted (by other components in the network infras-
tructure and the users).
(iii) We assume that the network infrastructure components (such as physical
and virtual switches, routers, gateways and servers) in the 5G network and the
Internet are equipped with some trusted computing technology such as TPM
chip [31]. Most systems including servers, laptops and mobile devices that are
manufactured today have such a TPM chip embedded in them. Hence it is rea-
sonable to assume that the infrastructure components are equipped with TPM.
3.3 Security Management Application
A key component of our security architecture is the Security Management Appli-
cation (SMA) hosted on the SDN Controller. Note as indicated in our assump-
tions, we consider SMA to be trusted and not compromised. In this section, we
describe the SMA and its components, namely Policy Repository and Engine
(PRE), Security Function Repository (SFR), Security Function Enforcement
Component (SFEC) and Activity Logs Component (ALC) (See Figure 1).
PRE: is used for storing fine granular policies required for achieving end to end
security in intra and inter domain communications. PRE stores security policies
for all physical and virtual resources in a given domain, security profiles for each
user and security policies for intra and inter domain communication. The secu-
rity profile of a user contains fine granular information on the different devices
and service specific requirements of that user. Then extraction component of
PRE extracts the relevant fields from the repository PR which match with the
attributes in the request and forwards them to SFEC.
SFR: stores the different security functions needed for the provision of 5G secu-
rity services. In our architecture, SFR contains the following security functions:
Trust Validation Function (TVF), Infrastructure Monitoring Function (IMF),
Network Slice Access Function (NSAF), Flow Validation Function (FVF), Key
Generation Function (KGF) and Flow Security Function (FSF). We will describe
below how each of these functions are used in our architecture for mitigating dif-
ferent attacks and achieving securing communications in 5G networks.
SFEC: is used for enforcing the security policies on the various 5G infrastructure
components via dynamic deployment of the required security functions. In our
architecture, the enforced polices are fine-grained such as flow specific, device
specific, service specific, user specific, slice specific and domain specific functions.
Network slice manager (in our case, SDN Controller) invokes these functions for
securing the virtual/physical infrastructure from attacks. In addition, the users
can also invoke these functions as part of security-as-a-service.
ALC: is used for maintaining a log of all activities and transactions of the SMA.
Let us now consider the Security Function Repository (SFR) in our architecture.
TVF: The TVF uses TPM-based remote attestation to validate, at boot time,
the state of the 5G infrastructure component, before VNF deployment. The
attestation process involves measuring the state of the hardware and software
parts of the infrastructure component in the form of hash values, and storing
a signed version of these values in the form of trusted certificates. In principle,
these trusted expected hash values can be created at any time. Most commonly
this is done at boot time. Then, when a network slice makes an attestation re-
quest, the trusted platform provides an attestation report, which includes the
Fig. 1: Security Architecture for 5G Network
measured hash values at the time of request. The basic idea is that if there is
a match between the measured hash values (at the time of request) and the
expected trusted hash values (e.g. at boot time), then this indicates that the
components are in a known and trusted state for deployment of VNFs.
In our architecture, the TVF on the SMA requests an attestation report from a
physical or virtual infrastructure components and validates the report. The SMA
will deploy security functions on the infrastructure component only if there is a
match between the measured and expected hash values. Otherwise, the infras-
tructure component is considered to be compromised and an alert is raised to
the SDN Controller administrator.
IMF: The TPM remote attestation typically only validates the state of the in-
frastructure component at boot time. However, the infrastructure components
can be vulnerable to attacks during run time. IMF is used in the validation of
the state of the infrastructure components at run time to detect attacks. For
instance, in our architecture, we have developed functions for validating the flow
rules enforced in the switches at run time. In this case, the IMF requests the net-
work switch to report the set of current flow rules being enforced at the switch.
The IMF then uses the trusted logs in the ALC to generate a trusted report on
the expected state of the switch. The IMF compares the trusted report with the
switch report to detect attacks, if there is any variation between them.
NSAF: The NSAF is deployed in the infrastructure component connected to the
user devices (e.g. gNodeB). This function is used to ensure that only authorised
devices are able to access the services in specific network slices. It also enforces
decisions taken by Flow Validation Function (FVF), for instance, dropping re-
quests from authorised devices which are found to be malicious by the FVF.
An important advantage of the NSAF is that attacks from malicious devices are
prevented closest to the source of attack, at the entry of 5G network.
FVF: This function enables network slice managers to monitor the usage of
resources by authorised devices within the slices. FVF uses signature based and
anomaly based attack detection mechanisms using machine learning techniques
for attack detection within the slices. If a flow from any device is found to be
malicious, then it is terminated and an alert raised to SMA. The SMA dynam-
ically isolates the flows from the malicious devices at the slice entry point by
invoking NSAF. FVF can be invoked in the access network or the core or edge
network depending on the latency requirements for the services in the specific
slice. However, as FVF detects the attacks by monitoring the flows at the slice
level, if fine-grained attack detection is needed, then users have the choice to
select device specific security functions as part of security-as-a-service.
KGF: KGF is used to generate symmetric keys in the provision of security-
as-a-service for securing communications of IoT applications or legacy devices
in critical infrastructures. If the users have opted for securing communications,
the SMA will invoke KGF to generate symmetric key for securing the flows and
distribute the key to the communicating infrastructure components.
FSF: The FSF is invoked for securing communications between the end devices.
It uses the symmetric key generated by the KGF for encrypting the flow at
the component that is connected to the source device and decrypt the flow at
the component that is connected to the destination device. Note that the flows
are validated by the NSAF and FVF before they are encrypted by FSF. If the
flow security policy mandates secure communication between the end devices,
the SMA will use KGF to generate the required symmetric key for securing the
flows and distribute the key to the relevant infrastructure components.
Industrial control infrastructures that were historically implemented as physi-
cally separate systems are being increasingly connected to the Internet for their
maintenance/cost minimisation. Often such infrastructures have legacy systems
which may not be able to support any security functionality. In such cases, the
FSF can be used for securing communications between the end systems.
Device Specific Security Function: Users use this function to enforce poli-
cies that are specific to their devices. For instance, users can specify fine granular
fingerprints for their devices and white or black lists for each of their devices.
3.4 Security Architecture - Operation
Assume that a user has multiple devices registered with the SMA. The Secu-
rity Profile of the user contains users personal attributes such as username and
ID, role, and organization, and the user’s service contract. The service contract
specifies the attributes of the devices belonging to a user; these include the con-
tractID, type of device, the number of each type of device, services that can be
accessed by the registered user’s device and the category this service belongs
to (e.g. service X belongs to healthcare category) and the security requirements
for the different services (such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication and
accountability). A user is allowed to have multiple contracts. For instance, a
user in his role as an employee of an organization X can have a service contract,
contractID, whereas in a different role can have another contract. We have also
defined a role called Personal-Role is defined for each user, which enables the
user to have a service contract as an individual. PR has policies associated with
the users. For example, a simple representation of a policy rule is of the form
PRi= <RequestID; DeviceID; UserID, name, ID, Role, Organization;Services;
Actions>, where i is the Policy Rule Identifier.
This rule defines the set of <Actions> for a request from a user with specific
attributes (such as UserID) for Services using a device DeviceID.
SFEC is used to establish secure communication flows and to monitor the ongo-
ing communications for detecting different types of attacks based on the user’s
specific service contract.SFEC provides the main interface for interactions with
the NSSF in the 5G core.
Step 1: Assume that a user has been registered with her devices UE1 and UE2.
In this paper, we will not consider the authentication protocols that have been
used to authenticate the user and the information during the registration pro-
cess. This paper assumes the use of standard authentication protocols and that
they are secure. Further, let us assume that UE1 is to be used to access a health-
care service whereas UE2 is to be used for accessing a financial service. These
specifications have been defined as part of the policy specifications in the PRE
as part of the registration process.
Now let us assume that UE1 is switched on to access a healthcare service. UE1
now finds a 5G cell and sets up a radio connection with a gNodeB and generates
a new flow request to gNodeB. The gNodeB has no information related to this
specific flow from this user.
Step 2: gNodeB then forwards the request to Network Slice Selection Function
(NSSF), which then sends the request to the SMA. We have abstracted sev-
eral flows in the simplified diagram in Figure 1. Normally the gNodeB selects
the AMF to determine the network slices subscribed to the device which then
contacts NSSF.
– The 5G gNodeB selects an AMF that supports the network slices requested
by the device. The 5G gNodeB becomes aware of the capabilities of the
AMFs through the N2 interface.
– The AMF learns about the network slices subscribed by the device from the
UDM (after authentication provided by UDM).
The AMF determines the allowed network slices for the device in the current
registration.
– If the AMF itself does not support all the slices requested by the device,
then it seeks help from the NSSF to choose another suitable AMF. In such
a case, the NSSF provides one or more allowed network slices for the device
and works with the NRF to determine the set of AMFs that can provide
these network slices.
Step 3: The NSSF then interfaces with the SMA through SFEC. The SFEC
uses the PRE to check the policy rules and information associated with the user
and his devices.
– PRE extracts the relevant fields from the user security profiles in the reposi-
tory and forwards them to the SFEC. Here, there are different design choices
possible. In our architecture, we pass the information on all network slices
that the devices belonging to this particular user are subscribed to. Hence
in this example, it will pass the network slices related to both the devices
UE1 and UE2 of this user. This will include all the services that can be ac-
cessed using these two devices and the security requirements associated with
all these services. Furthermore, during this step, logging of various actions
carried out by the PRE are done by the ALC.
– SFEC then composes dynamically the Network Security Functions (NSF).
This contains instances of different security functions from the repository
SFR required based on the information from PRE in Step 3. In this example,
it contains instances of two functions NSAF and FVF as shown in Fig 4.
Step 4: The SFEC then deploys the Network Security Functions (NSF) at the
gNoneB via the NSSF through the standard 5G interfaces. A deployed function
consists of VNF instances and associated resources (e.g. compute, storage, and
networking resources). Furthermore, as in the previous step 3, again logging of
various actions carried out by the SFEC are done by the ALC.
Step 5: First the Network Security Access Function (NSAF) instance is invoked
at NSF to determine whether the user request using UE1 is allowed to access
the services in the slice. This ensures that only the authorised devices and users
are allowed to access the services in the specific network slice. In our design,
we have allowed an unregistered device and user to be able to access a generic
network slice (similar to a guest account) enabling limited communications over
5G network. An user can use this generic network slice to register his/her device
following standard authentication protocols as mentioned above. Alternatively,
the user can register his/her devices via out-of-band channel.
Then the FVF instance is invoked at the network slice accessed by the user de-
vice to monitor the usage of resources by authorised devices within the network
slice. As mentioned earlier, the FVF uses signature and anomaly based detec-
tion for enforcing flow based security policies. Note in this particular case, the
FVF instance is being deployed at gNodeB. However, as shown in Figure 6 (see
Appendix), FVF can be invoked in the access network or core network or edge
network depending on the latency requirements for the services in the specific
slice [24], [25], [18]. The design choice as to where FVF is deployed is dependent
on the particular service and its provision. If for instance, the resource that needs
to be monitored is a server in the cloud which provides the service, then it is
more appropriate for FVF instance to be deployed close to the place where the
service that is to be monitored is being run.
Step 6: Then UE1 sets up a connection in the healthcare slice to the Internet,
enabling data transfer to the server providing the healthcare service. This estab-
lishes bi-directional end-to-end secure communications are established between
UE1 and the health service provider with appropriate 5G quality of service. In
our case, from the point of view of security, this corresponds to appropriate secu-
rity mechanisms such as confidentiality and integrity (based on the information
in PRE), implemented using VNFs, ensuring that the flows are protected.
Step 7: Now consider another device UE2 belonging to the same user initiates a
request to access a different service, a financial service slice in 5G network. The
NSF in gNodeB already has information related to this flow request for UE2.
Recall the design choice made in our architecture is that all information related
to all network slices the devices of a given user are subscribed to (and the services
that can be accessed by these devices and their associated security requirements)
extracted from the PRE, are deployed in NSF by the SFEC. Hence NSAF and
FVF are automatically applied for the device UE2 as well.
Step 8: As in Step 6, bidirectional end-to-end secure communications can now
be established between the device UE2 and the the financial service provider
with appropriate security mechanisms applied to the communication flows.
3.5 Example Scenario and Mitigation of Attacks
Attack Scenario 1: Consider the attack case where the attacker has compro-
mised one of the users devices and it is used to generate DoS attack on different
network slices. This could happen for instance if one of the smart home devices
such as a home printer is compromised by Mirai botnet and is used to flood the
healthcare service slice in 5G network.
Using our security architecture, only the devices that are authorised to have the
capability to access the healthcare service slice will be able to do so. So the flow
from the home printer will be first checked by the NSAF, which will detect that
the flow is not authorised to access healthcare slice and hence will drop the flow.
Attack Scenario 2: Now consider the situation where a wearable healthcare
sensor device, which is authorised to access the healthcare slice generates the
flooding attack. In this case, NSAF will permit the flow from the wearable sen-
sor to the healthcare slice. However, the signature or anomaly-based detection
in FVF detects the suspicious flows from wearable healthcare sensor and raises
an alert to SMA. SMA then dynamically configures the NSAF to drop the flows
from malicious wearable sensor at NSAF. Note that in this case, it is more ef-
ficient for the NSAF to be implemented at the entry point of the slice at NSF
rather in the access network or core network, Hence our approach is able to deal
with such attacks in an efficient manner.
Attack Scenario 3: Now consider the situation where the server providing the
service to a user device (such as the healthcare wearable sensor) has been in-
fected with malware. The SMA deploys the Trust Validation Function (TVF)
at the server to validate the state of the server before the server is allowed to
provide the service to the user device. In our architecture, this is achieved at by
specifying policy rules in PRE which require state validation of the server prior
to service installation and provision. This in turn mitigates attacks that lead to
provision of malicious services. The state validation of the server at run time is
achieved using the Infrastructure Monitoring Function (IMF) at runtime.
Attack Scenario 4: Now consider the case where a users device UE accesses
a service via radio access network node gNodeB and then moves to a different
radio access networks gNodeB belonging to the same 5G network. The initial
network flow from the device UE was analysed to determine whether it was au-
thorised or not by the NSSF. Because both the radio networks belong to the
same Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and under the same SMA, the established au-
thorisations are handed over by the NSSF in gNodeB to gNodeB. When the UE
moves to another EPC, handover between different SMA in different domains in
5G networks need to happen. We will not consider this inter-domain mobility
scenario and the extensions to our security architecture in this paper. These are
currently being developed and we will address them in a separate paper.
4 Implementation and Analysis
We have developed a solution implementing our security architecture using a
SDN Controller, in which we have combined several authorities of the 5G NFV
architecture performing different functionalities into a single combined authority.
We have used a ONOS SDN Controller [5] and our simulation experiments have
been carried out using Mininet. In this section, we present the implementation
and analysis of our security architecture.
4.1 Prototype Implementation
The SMA has been implemented as an application of the ONOS SDN Controller
[5] Version 1.6.0 using Java and Integrated Development Environment for se-
curing 5G networks. We have used the ONOS application development interface
to implement the SMA. We have added extra modules to ONOS implementing
the various SMA functions. We have created specific Mininet scripts to create
the topology and simulations have been carried using a varying number of hosts
and switches. For easy presentation, we present the operation of our architec-
ture using simple network topology shown in Figure 2, with four network slices
represented in blue, red, green and black that are connected to specific services.
The slices are implemented using VLANs and the slices are distributed among
multiple paths as shown in the Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Implementation Scenario
In the scenario shown in Figure 2, a user has 4 devices(UE’S), where each UE
is registered to access a specific slices (VLAN’s) and specific services in the 5G
network. The IP address of the UE’s and services and the VLANID of the slices
are also shown in the Figure 2. The SMA creates and assigns flows from different
user devices to these VLANs. The mininet topology for this scenario is shown
in Figure 7 (see appendix). The slice access policies are stored in a JSON repos-
itory and SMA uses these policies to transfer the user flows through different
slices. For user and device details, we have created a user to device relational
database. Here, each user has multiple devices and each device has associated
with it different policy rules and actions. The action consists of access to specific
slices and related security functions. The policies can apply to users, devices,
flows or services (see Appendix: Figure 8 shows the SMA repository schema and
a sample policy for UE1 is presented in the Listing 1). To update, modify and
read the stored JSON policies, we have used the JAVA parser module. We have
developed additional modifications to the Mininet scripts to enforce the flow
isolation based on the Controller response.
When OVS1 (representing gNodeB) receives the first flow from a user device to
access a specific slice, it forwards the packet header to the Controller, which is
then forwarded to SMA. The SMA analyses the header to determine the specific
policies related to the user device and dynamically deploys the NSFs to validate
the flows from different user devices against attacks.
The security functions for virtual OpenFlow switches are implemented in Xen
VMM. We have used OVS version 2.5.0 on Xen 4.6 VMM with Dom0 running
Ubuntu 15.10. The SMA enables the NSF( ) security functions in the Dom0. The
NSAF( ) captures the VM traffic from the virtual interface and analyses the flow
from the virtual machine. If the flow is accessing a service slice that is not reg-
istered for the UE (virtual machine), then NSAF drops the packet and raises
an alert to SMA. If the flow is accessing a registered service slice, then the flow
is validated using FVF( ) using signature based detection and anomaly based
detection, and then forwarded to the specific service slice. If the flow matches
any of the attack signatures or found to be suspicious by the anomaly detection
module, then it is dropped and an alert is raised to the SMA.
There have been prior studies on the performance of different Controllers (e.g.
[3]). However, with our security solution, what we found is that the main over-
head has been due to the enforcement of security policies with the SMA at the
switches using the NSF(). Hence we have been primarily concerned with this
performance issues such as variation in end to end path setup time and through-
put with SMA and NSF, increase in latency with number of rules for traffic
validation, CPU overhead and memory overhead. We have also extended the
LINC-Switch [1] for dynamic encryption/decryption of flows using the crypto
module. We have used AES algorithm with key size 128 bits and analysed the
end to end delays for dynamic encryption of the flows at the ingress node and
decryption of the flows at the egress node. Due to space restriction we are only
presenting some of the results in this paper.
The average flow setup time between UE’s and the services increases with the
varying number of gNodeB’s (Figure 3). With ONOS default applications run-
ning, the average flow setup time for 100 gNodeB’s is 330.66ms and it steadily
increases to 2487.68ms with 500 gNodeB’s. On the other hand, with SMA and
NSF running over the controller causes some delay in flow setup time. In this
case, with 100 gNodeB’s the average flow setup time is 349.76ms and it increases
to 2589.18ms with 500 gNodeB’s.
4.2 Attack Detection using FVF( )
Consider a service slice that is related to critical services such as in a SCADA
system. Often critical infrastructure operators are hesitant to apply the patches
to their vulnerable services, as this may require the systems to be taken offline,
which may not be possible. Furthermore, sometimes operators are also worried
that patching itself can break the SCADA application. However, as long as the
349.76
720.65
1477.56
1938.33
2589.18
330.66
690.9
1420.65
1860.89
2487.68
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
100 gNodeB 200 gNodeB 300 gNodeB 400 gNodeB 500 gNodeB
P A
T H
  S
E T
U
P  
T I
M
E  
( M
S )
NUMBER OF gNodeB's
AVERAGE FLOW  SETUP TIME BETWEEN DEVICES
With SMA & NSF With default ONOS Applications
Fig. 3: Average flow setup time
systems remain unpatched, they are vulnerable to attacks. FVF() helps to pro-
tect such vulnerable systems by preventing the malicious traffic at the gNodeB
(switch) that is near to the source of attack. In this case, we have used a Kali
Linux virtual machine as the malicious client (UE1) to launch a Shellshock at-
tack on an unpatched Web Server (Service1) and attack signatures are applied at
NSF in OVS1 using FVF( ). As shown in Figure 4, the attack was not successful
and the malicious UE1 is isolated from the network. There is latency with the
use of signatures in flow validation. Table 1 presents the average latency results
for 10 runs for a varying number of signatures used for flow validation.
Fig. 4: Attack Prevention at source NSF
We have used the ITOC dataset for evaluating the anomaly detection functional-
ity of the FVF( ). Table 2 shows the results for anomaly detection using different
machine learning techniques for the ITOC dataset. We have also compared the
performance of Naive Bayes (NB), Decision Tree C 4.5 (DT) and Random Forest
(RF) classifiers with Chi Square and with an ensemble of feature selection meth-
ods Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) and Chi Square . As shown in Table
2, RF when executed with an ensemble of RFE and Chi Square achieved much
better accuracy of 98.888%. Figure 9 shows the Receiver Operating Character-
istics (ROC) curve plotted against the TPR and FPR for the machine learning
techniques executed with an ensemble of RFE and Chi Square.
4.3 Attack Detection on Infrastructure Elements
Let us now consider how SMA is used to detect attacks on the infrastructure
components in the 5G network.
SMA makes use of TVF( ) to validate, at boot time state of the switches before
configuring flow rules on the switches and uses IMF ( ) is used to detect the
Classifier+ Feature selec. Accuracy TPR TNR FNR FPR
NB (Chi Square) 68.760 51.100 81.544 48.89 18.455
DT (Chi Square) 92.740 88.54 97.7914 11.458 4.208
RF (Chi Square) 97.070 97.052 97.085 2.947 2.914
NB (RFE+ Chi Square) 68.723 51.112 81.460 48.887 18.539
DT(RFE+ Chi Square) 94.659 89.800 98.17 10.199 1.8266
RF (RFE+ Chi Square) 98.888 99.182 98.482 0.8176 1.517
attacks on the switches at runtime. The IMF requests the network switch to
report the set of current flow rules being enforced at the switch. The IMF then
uses the trusted logs in the ALC to generate a trusted report on the expected
state of the switch. The IMF compares the trusted report with the switch report
to detect attacks, if there is any variation between them. We have used VIM diff
tool for comparing the switch state report with the trusted report.The operation
of the IMF () for a legitimate scenario is shown in Figure 10.
Now consider that an attacker has initiated attack on the switch OVS1 to alter
some of the flow rules. In this case, we used Kali Linux machine (UE1) to generate
malicious flow mod message to insert an unauthorised flow rule in OVS1. At
Fig. 5: A) Switch Report; B) Trusted report
a later time, the IMF( ) in the SMA first sends a request to the switch OVS1
(ID=3346) to report the flow rules. The switch state report from switch OVS1 is
shown in the top Window A in Figure 5 which also includes the flow rule inserted
by the attacker. Now, IMF( ) generates a trusted report on the expected state of
the switch SW1 by querying the ALC database for switch ID=3346. The trusted
report on the expected state of the switch is shown in the below Window B in
Figure 10. The IMF( ) compares these reports using VIM diff tool. The IMF( )
detects this malicious flow rule when it compares the switch state report with
the trusted report shown below in the Window B in the Figure 5. So it invokes
the alert and restore component. The alert and restore component raises an alert
to the SMA Security Administrator.
5 Related Work
In this section, we briefly discuss important related works that are relevant to
our proposed security solution and architecture.
SDN and NFV are the key enabler technologies for 5G network [32], [23]. For
instance, techniques such as [22], [15] have been proposed for provisioning slice
as a service model to the tenants. The work in [14] proposed SDN and NFV
based authentication and authorisation framework for Identity and Access con-
trol of micro-services in 5G platforms for services virtualization, orchestration
and management. Our architecture assumes usage of standard authentication
protocols in 5G networks. The work in [28] makes use of SDN and NFV for
developing a security architecture framework with components such as policy-
based security management system, Service monitoring & analytics systems and
Virtual security functions to achieve desired security functionality. The Security
Policy Manager is used for structuring the security requirements and deploying
the required virtual security functions. The Service Monitoring & Analytics com-
ponent deployed in the orchestration layer is responsible for performing metrics
and notifications acquisition from virtual and physical infrastructure compo-
nents. However it does not present detail discussion on how the architecture is
used to deal with specific attacks. We have presented a detail discussion on our
security architecture components and how it can be used to deal with the specific
attacks in 5G networks.
Although there are significant benefits with SDN and NFV, security in SDN
and NFV is still at its infancy and security issues in these technologies [4] [26],
[16], [8], [19], [11] also impact the security in 5G networks [30], [10], [9], [2].
Hence we need to consider the security techniques that have been proposed to
enhance the security in these technologies. Porras et al. [6] proposed security en-
forcement kernel for securing the Controllers from northbound applications. It
uses role based access control to prevent northbound applications from making
unauthorised changes to the database in the Controller. Shin et al. [27] proposed
techniques for sandboxing the network applications to prevent common failures
of applications from halting the SDN Controller operation. Similar techniques
can be used with our security solution to protect the SMA from malicious SDN
Controller applications and improve the resilience of the Controllers.
There is some work on detecting the attacks on infrastructure components such
as switches. Jacquin et al. [17] proposed using TPM attestation to validate the
boot time state of the switches. However there can be attacks on the switches
during runtime which have not been addressed. Zhang et al. in [33] proposed
rule enforcement verification to detect rule modification attacks in OpenFlow
switches. REV uses recursive message authentication code to verify whether the
OpenFlow switches have enforced the flow rules. Our architecture makes use of
TVF, IMF and ALC in the SMA to detect attacks on switches. TVF is used to
to validate the boot time of switches. IMF and ALC are used to generate trusted
report on the expected state of switches to validate the flow rules enforced and
detect attacks during runtime.
In the current networks, denial of service of attacks are often detected or pre-
vented at the victim end and traceback techniques [7], [29], [20] are used to
determine the approximate source of the attack. Applications in 5G networks
have stringent latency requirements and such attacks can have severe impact
in 5G networks. Our architecture makes use of NSF() to validate the traffic
generated by the end nodes and drop the attack traffic at the source end.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a security architecture and its facilities and
mechanisms for securing 5G networks against specific security attacks. We have
developed and implemented a simplified version of the security architecture using
SDN and NFV technologies. We have demonstrated that the proposed architec-
ture is able to counteract attacks from malicious devices accessing 5G services
in an unauthorised manner or generating flooding and other denial of service
attacks. We have also provided mechanisms to ensure that the network func-
tions are deployed in trusted infrastructures thereby ensuring that 5G services
are not provided by malicious infrastructure components. Our security archi-
tecture also enables security-as-a-service in 5G networks, thereby allowing the
provision of security services in the form of network slices to devices and legacy
systems which are otherwise constrained and lack security functionalities. We
have implemented the proposed architecture and carried out experiments and
discussed results demonstrating how it can be used to counteract different types
of attacks. We are currently extending the architecture to counteract attacks in
a multiple 5G network operators’ environment. Furthermore, as part of this re-
search work, we are developing security services enabling dynamic establishment
of trusted end to end 5G services over multiple domain networked virtualised
infrastructures.
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Fig. 6: Network Scenario
Listing 1.1: A Sample Policy
{
” id ” : ”02” ,
” hos t ip ” : ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 ” ,
”hostmac ” : ” 0 0 : 0 9 : 0 0 :AA” ,
” d e s t i p ” : ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 8 ” ,
”dstmac ” : ” 0 0 : 0 9 : 0 0 :BB” ,
” f l ow id ” : ”78 b34x ” ,
” a c t i o n s ” : [
” S e r v i c e ” : ” Se rv i c e1 ” ,
” S l i c e−id ” :”VLAN200” ,
] ,
} ,
}
Fig. 7: Mininet Network View
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Fig. 9: ROC Curves
Fig. 10: A) Switch Report; B) Trusted report
